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Cal. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 51 Cal. 4th
421 (2011) (holding that revenue collected from water rights services
was a fee and not a tax and that the state agency did not violate the
Constitutional Supremacy Clause by collecting fees from federal
contractors).
Under Proposition 13, passed in 1978, any tax increases in
California required a two-thirds vote of the state legislature. Until
Proposition 26 passed in 2010, fees were not subject to the two-thirds
requirement. With tax increases a virtual political impossibility, and
California facing a chronic budget crisis, the legislature turned to fees
to offset losses in revenue to the general fund. In 2003, by a simple
majority vote, the legislature passed a law ("2003 law") cutting funding
to the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") and
instructing SWRCB to replace the revenue through the imposition of
fees on all water rights holders subject to its jurisdiction.
California had a hybrid water rights system of both riparian rights
and prior appropriation. California law grandfathered all existing
riparian rights, pueblo rights, and other appropriative rights in
existence in 1914. These represent about thirty-eight percent of state
waters and were not subject to SWRCB jurisdiction. Most rights
acquired after 1914 were subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation
and to SWRCB jurisdiction. The federal government and Native
Americans hold much of the remaining twenty-two percent of state
waters outside of SWRCB jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity.
Thus, only about forty percent of the waters in the state were subject to
SWRCB jurisdiction and, therefore, the 2003 law fees.
Under the 2003 law, SWRCB would assess an annual fee on water
rights holders and charge additional fees for water rights applications,
change of use applications, and registration of stock ponds, to name a
few. The fee amounts were set based on the operational needs of
SWRCB. SWRCB would no longer receive revenue from the general
fund. In 2003, the SWRCB budgeted 4.4 million dollars for its
operational needs. It determined that it would be unsuccessful in
collecting fees from a significant numbers of parties (approximately
forty percent), so it adjusted its revenue target to 7 million dollars to
offset the likely losses from those parties who fail to pay. Furthermore,
knowing that it could not levy a direct fee on the federal government,
SWRCB assessed fees on private parties contracting with the federal
government.
California Farm Bureau Federation ("Farm Bureau") and multiple
other parties challenged these new fees. These parties represented
persons who contracted with the federal Bureau of Reclamation
("Reclamation") for use of water from the Central Valley Project,
which diverts water for flood control, hydroelectricity, storage, and
wildlife protection. At trial, Farm Bureau argued: (1) the fees were an
illegal tax because it did not receive a two-thirds vote in the legislature;
(2) the fees were unconstitutional, as applied, because only forty
percent of water rights holders were responsible for 100 percent of the
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costs of the water rights program; (3) a fee on water rights amounts to
an illegal tax on real property; (4) the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution gave sovereign immunity to the federal government from
taxation (and imposition of fees) by states, and this sovereign
immunity extends to private parties who contract with the federal
government; and 5) the fees were unconstitutional as applied because
contractors were responsible for the fees on all federal water despite
only receiving a small proportion of that water.
Both the Superior Court of Sacramento County ("trial court") and
the Third Appellate District of the Court of Appeals ("court of
appeals") held that the fees were not a tax because the amount
reasonably related to agency operating costs and was, therefore,
constitutional. However, the court of appeals ruled that the fees on
federal contractors were unconstitutional because they violated the
sovereign immunity doctrine. The parties appealed the decision to the
California Supreme Court ("court").
The court noted that while it is not always clear what the difference
between a fee and a tax is, there are some important distinctions. In
general, taxes are for revenue collection, while fees cover the cost of
providing a specific benefit or service, or regulatory enforcement. In
addition, taxes are compulsory, whereas fees are optional and there is
no requirement to purchase the service. There may be an actual
benefit to the payers, but that was not a requirement. The amount of
the fee must reasonably relate to the cost of the program for which the
fee is charged. However, the relationship does not have to be exact a fee that produces a surplus in revenue may still be valid so long as
the government does not divert the revenue to the general fund.
The court held that the state legislature did not intend to impose a
tax. In this case, SWRCB held all fee revenue in the Water Rights
Fund, completely separate from the general fund. SWRCB used that
revenue in the Water Rights Fund to completely support its operations
and administrative costs. Therefore, the court held that the fees were
not an illegal tax.
Farm Bureau's second argument challenged the constitutionality
of the fees as applied. While SWRCB provided a benefit to all water
rights holders, only forty percent were subject to its jurisdiction and its
fees. Since SWRCB met 100 percent of its budget needs through fees,
those forty percent of water rights holders ended up paying for 100
percent of the program costs. Hence, Farm Bureau argued that the
fees were unreasonable because they were disproportionate to the
benefit they provided to those forty percent. According to Farm
Bureau, an unreasonable fee was actually a tax. SWRCB countered
that the fee was appropriate because about ninety-five percent of the
program costs related to providing services for those forty percent that
were subject to the fees.
The court held that the amount of the fees must reasonably relate
to the cost of the activity regulated - but that was a matter of fact for
the trial court to decide. Therefore, the court remanded that question
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for the trial court to determine.
The third argument by Farm Bureau was that imposing fees on
water rights amounted to a tax on real property and was, therefore,
unconstitutional. The court rejected the argument, stating that water
rights were not real property and the right is usufructuary only.
California owned the water itself for the benefit of its citizens.
In the fourth argument, the Farm Bureau claimed that the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevented states from
imposing taxes or fees on the federal government and that the
prohibition extended to private parties who contracted with the
federal government. Under the 2003 law, SWRCB could collect fees
from any party who contracted with Reclamation for use of a water
right that would otherwise be subject to fees. Essentially, this means
that SWRCB was transferring the fee burden for each federal water
right from Reclamation to the private contractors who used those
rights. The court held that the fees were appropriate, so long as their
application was limited to the extent of the use right that the private
Therefore, the fees did not violate the
contractor possessed.
Supremacy Clause.
Finally, the court addressed the argument that the fees, as applied,
violated the Supremacy Clause because private contractors were
responsible for 100 percent of the fees imposed on Reclamation's
water rights. Reclamation held 116 million acre feet in water rights
from the Central Valley Project but only delivered 6.6 million of that
for use by private contractors. However, the private contractors were
responsible for the full amount of the fees assessed on the 116 million
acre feet. Thus, according to Farm Bureau, the fee assessment was
highly disproportionate. In order for a fee on contractors to be
reasonable, it must be limited to the beneficial interest that party has
in the property. SWRCB countered by stating that while the assessed
federal rights far exceeded the actual delivery, other factors affected
that amount, such as evaporative losses, diversions for storage, and
water releases for wildlife. In addition, SWRCB said that its fees were
appropriate because the cost was discounted fifty percent to reflect the
fact that Reclamation diverted about half of the water for
hydroelectricity. According to SWRCB, the fee amount should take
into consideration the benefit derived from the use of a whole federal
water project and not just the actual amount successfully delivered.
SWRCB reasoned, therefore, that the fees appropriately considered
the total amount of Reclamation's water rights minus the amount
diverted for hydroelectricity.
The court agreed with SWRCB but noted that the trial court had
not made a factual determination as to how much of the water
Reclamation consumes during delivery to the contractors. The court
remanded back to the trial court to determine whether SWRCB made
a fair determination of the beneficial interest of the contractors.
Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
remanding to the trial court to make the appropriate factual
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determinations.
Michael L. Downey

COLORADO
Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Designated
Ground Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 382377 (Colo. Feb. 7, 2011)
(holding that a district's failure to comply with a stipulated decree's
filing deadline to perfect its conditional groundwater rights resulted in
abandonment of those rights).
Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Cherokee") and Upper Black
Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District ("UBS") entered
into a stipulation on January 25, 1999, concerning Cherokee's use of
two sets of wells in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Designated Ground
The water court incorporated the
Water Basin ("the Basin").
stipulation into a conditional water rights diligence decree
("stipulated decree") in March of 1999. The stipulated decree
required Cherokee to file an application to perfect its conditional
groundwater rights in the Basin within a two-year period after diverting
and applying the water to a beneficial use.
Cherokee first applied water from well 14 to a beneficial use in
December of 2000 and applied water from wells 15 and 16 to
beneficial use in April of 2002. Cherokee did not file an application to
make absolute its conditional rights to these wells, which had been
applied to beneficial use, until February of 2005. Cherokee applied
water from well 17 to beneficial use on April 28, 2006. The parties
disputed whether Cherokee filed to make a portion of well 17 absolute
on April 30, 2008, when Cherokee filed its motion to amend its
application, or on May 30, 2008, when Cherokee filed the amended
application.
UBS and the Bookers ("the Objectors") filed a motion to dismiss
Cherokee's application to make portions of wells 14-17 absolute in the
The water court ordered
District Court, Water Division 2.
abandonment of the conditional portions of wells 14-17 and awarded
attorney fees. Cherokee then appealed to the Colorado Supreme
Court ("the court").
The court held that the Objectors' motion to dismiss was not
subject to the three-year statute of limitations that governs contracts
because the Objectors filed the motion in response to Cherokee's
failure to comply with a stipulated water court decree. The court also
held that Cherokee stipulated away a sexennial schedule of filing
deadlines, notice prior to cancellation, and the ability to file within the
same month of diversion when it entered the stipulated decree.
The court further held that Cherokee did not comply with the two-

